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B
usinesscyclesinsmallemergingeconomiesdifferfromthoseindevel-
oped economies. Emerging economies feature interest rates that are
higher, more volatile, and countercyclical (interest rates are usually
acyclical in developed economies). These economies also feature higher out-
put volatility, higher volatility of consumption relative to income, and more
countercyclical net exports.1 Recent research is trying to develop a better
understanding of these facts, as has been done for U.S. business cycles.
Because of the high volatility and countercyclicality of the interest rate,
the (state-dependent) borrowing-interest rate menu is a key ingredient in any
model designed to explain the cyclical behavior of quantities and prices in
emerging economies. Some studies assume an exogenous interest rate.2 Oth-
ersprovidemicrofoundationsfortheinterestratebasedontheriskofdefault.3
This is the approach taken by recent quantitative models of sovereign default,
which are based on the framework proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).4
Thesearticlesbuildontheassumptionthatlenderscanpunishdefaultingcoun-
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1 See Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Uribe and Yue (2006).
2 See, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2003), and Uribe and Yue (2006).
3 Default episodes are not exceptional. Many nations have experienced episodes of sovereign
default, some of the latest being Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, and Argentina in 2001.
4 See Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); Arellano (forthcoming); Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2006); Bai and Zhang (2006); Cuadra and Sapriza (2006a, b); Lizarazo (2005a,b); and Yue (2005).252 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
tries by excluding them from international ﬁnancial markets. The assumption
is controversial on several grounds. First, it appears to be at odds with the
existence of competitive international capital markets (which is assumed in
these models). It is not obvious that competitive creditors would be able to
coordinate cutting off credit to a country after a default episode.5 Second,
empirical studies suggest that once other variables are used as controls, mar-
ket access is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by previous default decisions (see,
for example, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris 2004, Eichengreen and Portes 2000,
and Meyersson 2006).6
1. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This article studies the role of the exclusion assumption for business cycle
properties of emerging economies. It ﬁrst describes the business cycle prop-
erties of a sovereign default model with exclusion and compares them with
those of the same model without exclusion. The article ﬁnds that the presence
of exclusion punishment is responsible for a high fraction of the sovereign
debt that can be sustained in equilibrium. It also ﬁnds that the business cycle
statistics of the model are not signiﬁcantly affected by the exclusion punish-
ment. The model without exclusion generates annual debt-output ratios of
less than 2 percent. Whereas, the model with exclusion generates debt-output
ratios between 4.8 and 6.3 percent. On the other hand, the cyclical behavior
of consumption, output, interest rate, and net exports are not fundamentally
different in the models with and without exclusion. An additional limitation
shared by both model environments is that the volatility of the interest rate
and (to a lesser extent) of the trade balance are too low compared to the data.
This suggests that the exclusion assumption does not play an important role
in these dimensions, and therefore future studies that do not rely on the threat
of ﬁnancial exclusion will not necessarily be handicapped in explaining the
business cycle in emerging economies.
5 This point is also raised by Cole, Dow, and English (1995) and Athreya and Janicki (2006).
6 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) discuss how holders of defaulted bonds succeeded in
interfering with cross-border payments to other creditors who had previously agreed to a debt
restructuring. From this, they infer that holders of defaulted bonds may have been able to exclude
defaulting economies from international capital markets. On the other hand, they conclude that
“legal tactics are updated all the time, and new ways are discovered both to extract payment
from a defaulting sovereign as well as to avoid attachments.” In particular, they expect that “the
threat of exclusion may be less relevant for some countries or to all countries in the future.” For
example, they explain that after Argentina defaulted in 2001, “attempts to actually attach assets
have so far turned out to be fruitless.” In any case, other forms of ﬁnancing are always available to
defaulting economies (issuing bonds at home, aid, ofﬁcial credit, multilateral or bilateral ﬁnancing,
etc.). The discussion in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) suggests, therefore, that defaulting
economies might face at most a higher borrowing cost, though it is not clear how important this
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ThemodelstudiedinthisarticlebuildsontheframeworkstudiedinAguiar
and Gopinath (2006), which in turn, quantiﬁes the model presented by Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981). The most appealing feature about this setup is that it
reduces the default decision to a simple tradeoff between current and future
consumption without a major departure from the workhorse model used for
real business cycle analysis in the last decades. Recent quantitative studies on
sovereign default have shown that this environment can potentially account
for important business cycle features in emerging economies and that it can
be extended to address other issues (such as the optimal maturity structure
of sovereign debt).7 The framework studied in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
is the simplest among the ones presented in recent studies. This has the
advantage of making the discussion of the role of the exclusion assumption
more transparent.8 On the other hand, this has the disadvantage of hurting the
performance of the model along several dimensions. Where appropriate, the
article explains how the simplifying assumptions hurt the performance of the
model.
This article studies a small open economy endowed with a single trad-
able good. As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), two endowment processes
are considered: a process with shocks to the endowment level and a process
with shocks to the endowment growth rate. The objective of the government
is to maximize the present value of future utility ﬂows of the representative
agent. The government has only one ﬁnancial instrument available: it can
save or borrow using one-period bonds. These assets are priced in a com-
petitive market inhabited by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely lived, risk
neutral-lenders. Lenders have perfect information regarding the economy’s
endowment. The government makes two decisions in every period. First, it
decides whether to refuse to pay previously issued debt. Second, it decides
how much to borrow or save. The baseline model features two costs of de-
faulting. First, the country may be excluded from capital markets. Second, it
faces an “output loss.” The endowment is reduced in a ﬁxed percentage in the
period following a default. The assumption that countries experience an out-
put loss after a default intends to capture the disruptions in economic activity
entailed by a default decision. IMF (2002), Kumhof (2004), and Kumhof and
Tanner (2005) discuss how ﬁnancial crises that lead to severe recessions are
triggered by sovereign default.
7Arellano (forthcoming); Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2006); Bai and Zhang (2006); Cuadra
and Sapriza (2006a,b); Lizarazo (2005a,b); and Yue (2005) extend the framework in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) but maintain the basic assumptions (including the exclusion assumption).
8 The only difference between the model presented in this article and the model in Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) is that here it is assumed that there is a unique period of output loss af-
ter default—in contrast with the stochastic number of periods of output loss assumed by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006). This allows us to eliminate the threat of exclusion without increasing the
dimensionality of the state space. The Appendix shows that this departure does not have sizable
effects on the results.254 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
This article solves the model with and without the exclusion threat and
compares their behavior. Mechanically, in the model with shocks to the en-
dowment level, the default decision becomes relatively more sensitive to the
endowment shock once the exclusion threat is eliminated and, therefore, less
sensitivetothedebtlevel. Inturn,bondpricesbecomelesssensitivetothebor-
rowing level. On the other hand, in the model with shocks to the growth rate
thedefaultdecisionbecomesrelativelylesssensitivetotheendowmentshock,
whichincreasesthesensitivityofthebondpricetotheborrowinglevel. Given
that in this class of models the high sensitivity of the default probability to
the borrowing level limits their quantitative performance, the previous effects
slightly improve the performance of the model with shocks to the endowment
level and deteriorate the performance of the model with shocks to the growth
rate. In spite of this, both models still do not replicate the default rates, the




the economy can be excluded from capital markets. Section 5 studies how
the implications of the model change when the economy cannot be threatened
with ﬁnancial exclusion. Section 6 concludes the article.
2. THE MODEL
The environment studied in this article builds on the framework presented
by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), who study the quantitative performance of
a model of sovereign default based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Relative
to Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), the only difference is that it is assumed here
that there is a single period of output loss after default—in contrast with the
stochastic number of periods of output loss assumed in their article. The
Appendix shows that the results are not sensitive to this assumption.
The economy receives a stochastic endowment stream of a single tradable
good. The endowment process has two components: a transitory shock and a
trend shock, namely,
yt = ezt t, (1)
where yt denotes the endowment realization in period t, zt denotes the transi-
tory shock, and  t denotes the trend component.
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The trend component evolves according to












+ ρgln(gt−1) + εt, (4)











The objective of the government is to maximize the present value of fu-
ture utility ﬂows of the representative agent. The representative agent has





where σ denotes the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. Let β denote the dis-








The government makes two decisions in each period. First, it decides
whether to refuse to pay previously issued debt. Second, it decides how much
to borrow or save. As in previous quantitative studies, it is assumed that the
government faces two penalties if it decides to default. One penalty is that it
may be excluded from capital markets. The second penalty is that it faces an
exogenous “output loss” of λ percent in the period following a default.
Theexclusionstateevolvesasfollows. Inthedefaultperiod, theeconomy
is excluded from capital markets with probability 1−φ1, with φ1 ∈ [0,1].I n
every period that follows a period of exclusion, the economy regains access
to capital markets with probability φ ∈ [0,1] or remains excluded for one
more period with probability 1−φ.10 This implies that the expected length of
exclusion is given by
1−φ1
φ . If the economy was not excluded from ﬁnancial
markets at the end of the previous period, it is not excluded at the beginning
of the current period.
The government can choose to save or borrow using one-period bonds.
Thereisacontinuumofrisk-neutrallenderswith“deeppockets.” Eachlender
can borrow or lend at the risk-free rate r. Lenders have perfect information
9 The endowment process is motivated by the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). They
ﬁnd that shocks to trend growth (rather than transitory ﬂuctuations around a stable trend) are the
primary source of ﬂuctuations in emerging markets.
10 Previous quantitative studies of sovereign default assume that the government cannot bor-
row in the period it defaults (φ1 = 0), and it regains access to capital markets with a constant
probability (φ) after that. In order to accommodate this possibility, it is assumed that φ1 can be
different from φ.256 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
regardingtheeconomy’sendowment. Thebondpriceisdeterminedasfollows.
First, the government announces how many bonds it wants to issue. Then,
lenders offer a price for these bonds. Finally, the government sells the bonds
to one of the lenders who offered the highest price.
Let b denote the current position in bonds. A negative value of b denotes
that the government was an issuer of bonds in the previous period. Each bond






a current default decreases future output and affects future default decisions.
The government compares two continuation values in order to decide
whether to default or pay back the previously issued debt. The present dis-
counted utility after a default is represented by V1 (z, ,g,h). The variable h
denotesthecredithistoryofthegovernment. Ittakesavalueof1whenthegov-
ernmentdefaultedinthepreviousperiod,andittakesavalueof0whenthegov-
ernment did not default in the previous period. The present discounted utility
whenallpreviouslyissueddebtispaidbackisrepresentedbyV0 (b,z, ,g,h).
ThegovernmentdefaultsifthecontinuationvalueV1 (z, ,g,h)islargerthan
V0 (b,z, ,g,h) and does not default otherwise.
Letx denotetheexclusionstate. Thevariablex takesavalueof1whenthe
economyisexcluded,andtakesavalueof0otherwise. LetV(b,z, ,g,h,x)
denote the government’s value function at the beginning of a period.
In the period it defaults, the economy can or cannot be excluded from
ﬁnancial markets. Let ˜ V1 (z, ,g,h,0) denote the continuation value when
the economy defaulted and is not excluded. Let ˜ V1 (z, ,g,h,1) denote the
continuation value when it is excluded. Thus,
V1 (z, ,g,h) = φ1 ˜ V1 (z, ,g,h,0) + (1 − φ1) ˜ V1 (z, ,g,h,1). (5)
The timing of the decisions within a period is summarized in Figure 1. At
thebeginningoftheperiodtheendowmentshocksarerealized. Therealization
inperiodt ofastatevariablex isdenotedbyxt. Afterobservingtheendowment
realization, the government decides whether to pay back previously issued
debt. If it decides to pay the debt back, the government issues an amount
bND
t+1 of bonds and faces a continuation value of V0
 
bND
t+1,z t,  t,g t,0
 
.I f
the government defaults, it may or may not be excluded from capital markets
today. Ifitisnotexcluded,itfacesacontinuationvalueof ˜ V1 (zt,  t,g t,1,0,).
If it is excluded, it faces a continuation value of ˜ V1 (zt,  t,g t,1,1,). If the
government defaults and is not excluded today from capital markets, it issues
an amount bD
t+1 of bonds. After a default, the government faces an output loss
of λ percent in period t +1 regardless of whether it was excluded from capital
markets in period t.
The value function of a defaulting economy that is excluded in the default
period is computed as follows:
˜ V1 (z, ,g,h,1) = u(y (1 − hλ)) + βE
 
V(0,z  ,g  ,g ,1,e)
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Figure 1 Order of Events andAlternative Continuation Values in
Period t
Endowment shocks










V Issue 0(b ND





t z g 0) t t ( 1,
V1
~











V(0,z ,g  ,g ,1,e)
 
=
   
φV(0,z  ,g  ,g ,1,0)+








dg  | g
 
.
If the government has decided to default and is excluded in the period of
default, itconsumestheaggregateendowment(therearenoﬁnancialtransfers
from or to the rest of the world) and carries zero debt to the next period. At
the beginning of the following period, exclusion ﬁnishes with probability φ.
The expected continuation value of this scenario is V(0,z,g ,g,1,0). If the
exclusion time is extended, the expected continuation value
is V(0,z,g ,g,1,1).
The dynamic programming problem for a defaulting economy that is not
excluded in the default period is
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In this case, the government must choose how much debt it will issue.
The value function of the government when it has decided to pay back its
debt is obtained from the following Bellman equation:
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The function V (b,z, ,g,h,x) is computed as follows:
V (b,z, ,g,h,0) = max{V1 (z, ,g,h),V 0 (b,z, ,g,h)}, (9)
and
V (b,z, ,g,h,1) = u(y (1 − hλ)) + βE
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d (b,z, ,g,h) =
 
1i f V1 (z, ,g,h) >V 0 (b,z, ,g,h)
0i f V1 (z, ,g,h) ≤ V0 (b,z, ,g,h)
(10)
denote the equilibrium default decision.
The price of a bond if a default decision d was made in the current period
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denotes the probability that the government decides to default if it purchases
b  bonds, and the current default decision is d.
Equilibrium Concept
Deﬁnition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterized by
1. a set of value functions V (b,z, ,g,h,x), V1 (z, ,g,h),
and V0 (b,z, ,g,h);J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 259
2. asetofpoliciesforassetholdingsb 
0 (b,z, ,g,h)andb 
1 (b,z, ,g,h),
and a default decision d (b,z, ,g,h); and






(a) V (b,z, ,g,h,x), V1 (z, ,g,h), and V0 (b,z, ,g,h) satisfy the sys-
tem of functional equations (5)–(9);
(b) the default policy d (b,z, ,g,h) and the policies for asset holdings
b 
0 (b,z, ,g,h)andb 
1 (b,z, ,g,h)solvethedynamicprogrammingproblem
speciﬁed by equations (5)–(9); and




is given by equation (11).
Discussion of the Environment
The model analyzed in this article relies on several simplifying assumptions.
This has the advantage that the model remains tractable and that the main
mechanisms can be presented in a more transparent way. The disadvantage
of using such a stylized framework is that the model is ill-suited to account
for the quantitative behavior of some key variables.11 The rest of this section
discusses several simpliﬁcations embedded in the environment presented in
the previous section and extensions that have been studied in the literature.
Focusingonanendowmenteconomysimpliﬁestheanalysis. Amorecom-
prehensivestudyofthebusinesscyclewouldrequireincorporatingcapitaland
labor into the model. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) also consider an extension
of the basic model with labor as the only input in the production function.
The results do not change signiﬁcantly. More recently, Bai and Zhang (2006)
study a production economy with capital.
The model assumes that the government issues one-period bonds. Al-
lowing the government to issue long-term bonds would introduce nontrivial
complications to the analysis. For instance, if the government can issue two-
period bonds, it is necessary to keep track of how much debt was issued two
periodsago(whichisduetoday)andhowmuchdebtwasissuedoneperiodago
(which will be due tomorrow). Alternatively, if the government only issues
annuities there would only be one state: how many annuities have been issued
sincethelastdefault. However,thepricingoftheannuitiesissuedtodaywould
bemorecomplexthanthepriceofaone-periodbond. Lenderswouldnotonly
need to compute the probability of a default in the following period, but also
the probability of a default two-periods ahead, conditional on not observing a
default tomorrow; the probability of observing a default three-periods ahead;
11 Other authors have studied different extensions of this framework, which have improved its
quantitative performance. See, for example, Arellano (forthcoming); Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2006); Bai and Zhang (2006); Cuadra and Sapriza (2006a,b); Lizarazo (2005a,b); and Yue (2005).260 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
conditional on not observing a default in the next two periods; and so on.
Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2006) allow the government to issue short and
long bonds.
It was assumed that the government cannot issue bonds contingent on the
futurerealizationofitsendowment. Evenifcreditorshaveperfectinformation
regardingtheeconomy’sendowment, thiswouldnotimplythatcontractscon-
tingent on the endowment realization could be written (the endowment may
not be veriﬁable). In reality, one limitation for writing contracts contingent
on real variables is that the government could manipulate the measurement
of these variables (see Borensztein and Mauro 2004). Determining to what
extent bonds can be state contingent in reality and studying some degree of
state contingency in quantitative models of sovereign default are interesting
avenues for future research.
The assumption that countries experience an exogenous output loss after
defaulting intends to capture the disruptions in economic activity entailed by
a default decision. In general, default episodes are not observed in economic
booms but in recessions. This means that a fraction of the low economic
activity that is observed after a default episode can be explained by weak fun-
damentals pre-existing the default decision. Thus, not all of the decrease in
economic activity observed after a default is related to the default decision
and cannot be considered as a cost of defaulting. On the other hand, default
decisionsarelikelytointroducedisruptionsineconomicactivityofthedefault-
ing economy. IMF (2002), Kumhof (2004), and Kumhof and Tanner (2005)
discuss how ﬁnancial crises that lead to severe recessions are triggered by
sovereign default. This is due to the fact that government debt is not only held
by foreigners but also by locals, and in particular by local banks—something
that is not explicitly considered in the stylized model studied in this article.
Thus, government default may hurt ﬁnancial intermediation signiﬁcantly (see
IMF 2002 for a discussion of recent episodes).12
In the model, the output loss triggered by the default decision is indepen-
dent of the size of the default. If the output loss represents the damage made
by the default decision through the local ﬁnancial system, it could be argued
that the loss should depend (positively) on the amount that is not repaid by the
government (in particular, it should depend on the amount held by the locals;
see, for example, IMF 2002). Considering this would introduce additional
complications to the analysis though it is an interesting avenue to be pursued
12 In the stylized model discussed in this article, the output loss of λ percent in the period
after a default intends to capture the cost of defaulting implied by the disruptions in economic
activity triggered by the declaration of default. The calibration of the parameter λ should capture
these disruptions and does not intend to match the overall decrease in output observed after a
default. In contrast to the exclusion from capital markets, the output loss does not intend to
capture a punishment imposed by creditors. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) discuss output loss as the
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in future work. If the output loss depends on the amount not paid by the
government, it can be argued that the government should also be allowed to
choose the size of the default.13 Arellano (forthcoming) argues that the output
loss depends on the state of the economy and, thus, introduces this into the
model.
Previous quantitative studies assume that after default, the economy suf-
ferstheoutputlossforastochasticnumberofperiods(theperiodsinwhichthe
economy is excluded from capital markets). For simplicity, this assumption
is modiﬁed in this article. Assuming that the output loss lasts for a stochastic
number of periods in a context in which there is no ﬁnancial exclusion raises
the possibility of scenarios in which the government defaults before the dura-
tion of output losses triggered by the previous default has ended. This would
require keeping track of the number of output losses the economy is suffering
andwouldincreasethedimensionalityofthestatespace. TheAppendixshows
that the results are not sensitive to the modiﬁcation of the output loss process
utilized in this article.
The assumption that countries are excluded from capital markets after a
default episode is motivated by evidence of a drainage in capital ﬂows into
countries that defaulted (see, for example, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris 2004).
However, it very well may be that the difﬁculties in market access observed
after a default episode respond to the same factors that triggered the default
decision itself.14 In support of this, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) doc-
ument that once other variables are used as controls, market access is not
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by previous defaults (see also Eichengreen and Portes
2000 and Meyersson 2006). Moreover, it is not obvious that after a default
episode competitive creditors would be able to coordinate cutting off credit to
defaulting countries. Thus, the study of an environment in which a defaulting
economy cannot be excluded from capital markets is the ﬁrst building block
of any work that attempts to explain the exclusion outcome as an endogenous
outcome of the model.
13 In this article, the government must decide whether it honors all the debt issued in the
previous period or whether it defaults on all of it. But this is not a restrictive assumption given
that the costs of defaulting are orthogonal to the amount of debt that is repudiated. In this case,
the government would never ﬁnd it optimal to default on less than a 100 percent of the outstanding
debt. This would not be the case if the cost of defaulting depends on the amount repudiated. Yue
(2005) studies partial default in an environment in which the defaulted amount is decided in a
bargaining process between the government and the lenders.
14 For example, Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2006b) analyze a model in which both
default and the difﬁculties in market access after default may be triggered by a change in the
policymaker in power.262 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Parameter Values Speciﬁc to Models I and II





Notes: A period in the model corresponds to a quarter.
3. PARAMETERIZATION
The model is solved numerically using value function iteration and interpola-
tion as in Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2006a).15 Whenever possible,
this article considers the same parameter values as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), which facilitates the comparison of the results. To solve the model
numerically, Bellman equations are ﬁrst recast in detrended form. All vari-
ables are normalized by μg t−1 as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). This
normalization implies that the mean of the detrended endowment is one.
EventhoughAguiarandGopinath(2007)arguethatthebestrepresentation
of the output process for emerging economies is characterized by equations
(1) through (4), this speciﬁcation requires keeping track of z and g as state
variables. Thecomputationalmethodusedinpreviousarticlesintheliterature
does not allow solving for this speciﬁcation without incurring sizable approx-
imation errors. Instead, they consider two alternative endowment processes.
In Model I, the economy is hit only with transitory shocks (z shocks). In
Model II, the economy is hit with shocks to the trend only (g shocks). Table
1 reports the parameter values speciﬁc to each of the two model alternatives.
Parameters values that are common across models are presented in Table
2. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume an output loss of 2 percent during
the exclusion period. This is based on empirical estimates of the output loss
triggered by a default decision (see Chuhan and Sturzenegger 2005). As
explained above, for simplicity this article assumes that all output loss occurs
only in one period, the period that follows the decision. The value of λ is
calibrated to make the output-loss cost of defaulting in this article equivalent
to the one in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). In particular, the value of λ is
chosen to be such that for Model I, the mean debt level in the simulations is
thesameastheoneintheoriginalformulationofAguiarandGopinath(2006).
We show that this value (of λ) enables Model II to generate a similar level of
debt as inAguiar and Gopinath (2006).
15 The value functions V0 and V1 are approximated using Chebychev polynomials. Fifteen
polynomials on the asset space and ten on the endowment shock are used. Results are robust to
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Table 2 Parameter Values Common to Models I and II
Risk Aversion σ 2
International Interest Rate r 1%
Probability of Redemption in the Same Period of Default φ1 0%
Probability of Redemption φ 10%
Mean Growth Rate μg 1.006
Mean (log) Transitory Productivity μz −0.5σ2
z
Discount Factor β 0.8
Loss of Output λ 8.3%
Notes: A period in the model corresponds to a quarter.
Exceptforthevalueofλ,theremainingparameterstakethesamevaluesas
inAguiarandGopinath(2006). Thecoefﬁcientofrelativeriskaversionof2is





2000. The subjective discount factor is set to 0.8. This departs from standard
macro models. As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), in the stylized framework
discussedinthisarticle,alowdiscountfactorisneededtoinducetheeconomy
to accumulate debt and be willing to accept a higher spread over the risk-free
interest rate (the international interest rate). The limitations faced by the
stylized framework to generate default with more reasonable discount factors
may be a consequence of its simplifying assumptions.16 As was mentioned
previously, recent articles study different extensions of this framework that
improve its quantitative performance (assuming that lenders can use ﬁnancial
exclusion as a punishment).
4. RESULTS WITH EXCLUSION
This section presents the results obtained when the parameters that determine
the exclusion process are chosen as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), that is,
φ1 = 0andφ = 0.1. Thismeansthatthegovernmentcannotissuebondsinthe
period it defaults, and after that it faces a constant probability φ of regaining
access to capital markets.
16 For example, the end of Section 4 describes how the assumption that the government
can only issue one-period bonds increases the marginal issuance cost. If it were not for the low
discount factor, the issuance volume and spreads observed in equilibrium would be even lower
than what is observed in the data.264 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Default Regions
























Notes: Default region when the endowment is hit with transitory shocks (top panel) and
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Equilibrium Default Region and Bond Prices with
Exclusion
TheshadedareasinFigure2displaythedefaultregions(i.e.,thecombinations
of endowment shocks and debt levels for which the economy would choose to
default)ofthemodelwithtransitoryandtrendshocks.17 Bothgraphsshowthat
the higher the endowment shock, the higher the minimum debt level at which
it is optimal to declare a default. From another perspective, for a given initial
debt level, the government ﬁnds it optimal to default only if the endowment
shock is sufﬁciently low.
The beneﬁt of defaulting is that resources that would have been allocated
to pay back previously issued bonds are, instead, allocated to current con-
sumption. There are two costs entailed by a default decision: a loss in output
and the inability of the government to use international capital markets to
smooth out domestic endowment shocks. It should be noticed that the “costs”
of defaulting do not depend on the debt level at the time of default. Thus, a
higher initial debt level increases the beneﬁts of a default without increasing
thecosts. Forsufﬁcientlylargedebtlevels, thebeneﬁtsofdefaultingoffsetthe
“ﬁxed” costs. This explains why in Figure 2 it is optimal for the government
to default on relatively large values of debt (low b).
A low endowment shock implies that there are less resources available in
the current and subsequent periods.18 Given that the output loss that follows
a default decision is a constant fraction of the underlying potential output,
it is more costly to default for high endowment realizations than for low
endowment realizations. In the model with transitory shocks, this is the main
forcebehindthenegativerelationshipbetweentheshocktotheendowmentand
the debt threshold at which the government is indifferent between defaulting
and not defaulting.19 However, in the model with trend shocks, a high shock
today signals higher growth rates in the future. This increases the desire to
borrow as it allows bringing future resources to the current period. The fact
that the ability to borrow is more valuable in good than in bad times helps
explain why the government defaults only on larger debt volumes in good
times.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium bond prices faced by the government as
a function of the current issuance level (−b) and the endowment shock. The
17 The detrended output process has a mean of 1. This implies that the debt levels b in
Figure 2 correspond to the ratio of debt-to-mean output.
18 Both the trend shocks and the transitory shocks display positive autocorrelation.
19 If the endowment is low, the marginal utility of consumption is high, and therefore the
gain from defaulting is high. However, if the model with transitory shocks is solved assuming that
the output loss is a ﬁxed amount instead of a percentage of output, the default region becomes
almost vertical but with a positive slope. This is due to the fact that with a high endowment
shock the economy displays a less intense desire to issue debt, and therefore it assigns a lower
value to retaining access to capital markets.266 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Bond Price Menus
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Notes: Equilibrium bond price menu faced by the government at low and high endow-
ment realizations. The low endowment realization is three standard deviations to the left
of the unconditional mean. The high endowment realization is three standard deviations
to the right of the unconditional mean. The top panel shows the equilibrium bond price
in the model with shocks to the level. The bottom panel shows the equilibrium bond
price in the model with shocks to the trend.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 267
curves have a waterfall shape. For relatively low issuance levels there is no
risk of default. In this case, competitive investors demand the risk-free rate in
compensation for purchasing the government’s bonds. For issuance volumes
for which there is a positive probability of default tomorrow, the rate of return
demanded for holding bonds is higher than the risk-free rate, i.e., the price
offered is lower than 1
1+r. Finally, for sufﬁciently high issuance volumes, it
is common knowledge that the government would default in the following
period for almost any endowment realization. In this case, investors offer a
zero price for each bond issued today.
It should be noted that price q is nondecreasing in the current endowment
realization. In other words, the higher the endowment, the higher the issuance
level at which the price starts to fall. This is due to the persistence in the
endowmentprocessandtheshapeofthedefaultregions. Ahigherendowment
todayimpliesthatitismorelikelytoobservehighendowmentsinthefollowing
period, and therefore it makes the default probability lower.
Business Cycle Properties With the Exclusion
Punishment
Themodelissimulatedfor750,000periods(500samplesof1,500observations
each). In order to compute business cycle statistics, 400 samples of the last
72 periods before a default episode are used. The samples selected are such
that the last exclusion period was observed at least two periods before the ﬁrst
period in the sample. The number of periods in each sample is equal to the
numberofperiodsinthedatacomparedwiththesimulations(Argentina1983–
2000). Restrictingtosamplesatleasttwoperiodsawayfromthelastexclusion
period helps avoid extreme observations that may distort the results.20 The
moments reported below correspond to the average across the 400 samples.
The behavior of four series is analyzed: the logarithm of income (y), the
logarithm of consumption (c), the ratio of the trade balance to output (tb), and
the annualized spread (Rs). All series are ﬁltered using the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Standard deviations are denoted
by σ and are reported in percentage terms; correlations are denoted by ρ.
Table 3 reports business cycle moments observed in the data (Argentina
1983–2000) and in Models I and II. With the exception of the debt-to-output
20 In the periods that follow an exclusion period, the government inherits little or no debt
from previous periods. The consequence is that in these periods the government borrows a relatively
low amount, and thus it pays relatively low spreads compared to what is observed in the remaining
observations. In the simulations, these outliers may appear up to two periods after the end of an
exclusion period. It is judged that it is more appropriate to present results computed without
considering these outliers. Simulation results are contrasted against data from Argentina during a
period in which the economy was not excluded from capital markets. Moreover, these outliers can
alter the calculations of business cycle statistics (see Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza 2006a).268 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 3 Business Cycle Statistics
Data Model I Model II
Transitory Shocks Trend Shocks
σ(y) 4.08 4.14 4.15
σ(c) 4.85 4.23 4.38
σ (tb) 1.36 0.20 0.63
σ (Rs) 3.17 0.006 0.013
ρ (c,y) 0.96 0.99 0.99
ρ (tb,y) -0.89 -0.43 -0.29
ρ (Rs,y) -0.59 -0.80 -0.06
ρ (Rs,tb) 0.68 0.85 0.89
Mean Debt Output Ratio (%) 51 6.3 4.8
Rate of Default 75 6.6 24
Notes: The moments correspond to the average across 400 samples. The debt output
ratio is measured as the stock of debt divided by the annual output level.
ratio, the business cycle moments for Argentina are taken from Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006). The moments are chosen so as to evaluate the ability of
the models to replicate the distinctive business cycle properties of emerging
economies that were described in the beginning of the article. It must be said
that the sample moments for Argentina display the same qualitative features
observed in other emerging markets.21
The moments in the simulated samples generated by Models I and II are
differentfromthemomentsreportedinAguiarandGopinath(2006). Themain
reason is that they use a different computational method from the one used
in this article. While, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use a discrete state space
method, we use interpolation methods and a nonlinear optimization routine to
ﬁnd the optimal issuance levels. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2006a)
demonstrate that the numerical errors incurred by the discrete state space
technique may lead to misleading conclusions in some dimensions. The most
important one is that the spread volatility becomes negligible once the model
is solved using a more accurate method. Other statistics about the behavior
of the spread over the business cycle are also susceptible to numerical errors
when the model is solved using a discrete state space technique.22
21As previously mentioned, emerging economies feature interest rates that are high, volatile,
and countercyclical; high volatility of consumption relative to income (typically, higher than one);
and countercyclical net exports (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath 2007; Neumeyer and Perri
2005; and Uribe and Yue 2006).
22A second reason behind the discrepancy between the moments in Table 3 and in Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) is that the setups are not exactly the same. In their model, the output loss
lasts as long as the exclusion punishment. In the present setup, the output loss lasts for only
one period. The Appendix shows that this difference accounts for only a small fraction of the
discrepancy in the performance of the two models.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 269
Figure 4 The Effect of the Bond Price Menu on the Objective Function












































Notes: Objective function and price function faced by the government when z = μz and
b =− 0.25 (which is within the range observed in the simulations). The vertical line
represents the optimal issuance level.
Thetableshowsthatbothmodelsfailtogeneratethevolatilitiesofthetrade
balance and spread observed in the data. In particular, the standard deviations
of the spread are two orders of magnitude lower than the value observed in the
data. This is an important limitation of both models. Moreover, Models I and
II generate 6.6 and 24 defaults in 10,000 periods, respectively. These values
are below the ratio of 75 defaults in 10,000 periods computed by Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) using a sample of emerging markets from 1824
to 1999, though it is not clear that this is the frequency that the model should
replicate.23 An alternative procedure is to compare the default rate generated
bythemodelwiththedefaultrateimplicitintheaveragespreadobservedover
the sample period (under the assumption of risk-neutral lenders). The value
23 The model is calibrated to match the macroeconomic behavior of Argentina between 1983
and 2000, while the default rate computed in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) is based on
a different time period and a sample of various countries.270 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of the latter is 243 defaults for every 10,000 periods, which is even further
away from the model predictions.
On the other hand, the models are able to generate a high volatility of
consumption relative to income and the sign of the co-movements between
the trade balance, spread, and output that are observed in the data.24
Discussion of the Results With the Exclusion
Punishment
Thissectiondescribesthetradeoffsthegovernmentfaceswhenitdecideshow
much debt to issue. This helps in understanding the logic behind the results
presented inTable 3. The section focuses on the model with transitory shocks
(z), though the same logic applies to the model with trend shocks.
Given the monotonicity of the default decisions (see Figure 2), the bond
price function faced by the government when it decides how much to borrow














where z∗  
b  
denotes the next period endowment shock that makes the gov-
ernment indifferent between defaulting and not defaulting on a debt level b ,
and F denotes the cumulative distribution function for the next period shock.
If the endowment shock in the following period is lower than z∗, the govern-
ment will default on b . If it is higher than z∗, the government will pay back
b . In the top panel of Figure 2, z∗  
b  
represents the frontier of the shaded
area. Equation (12) shows that the shape of price q mirrors the shape of the







The solid line of Figure 4 displays the bond price menu faced by the
government in a period in which the endowment realization is equal to the





















  , (13)
where f denotes the density function of future shocks. This equation shows
that the shape of the bond price depends on two factors: the probability dis-
tribution f and the sensitivity of z∗ to changes in b
 
(the shape of the default
region). The assumption that future endowment shocks are drawn from a
24 The table does not report statistics about the current account. Given that both models
generate a relatively stable debt level and a low volatility of the interest rate, interest payments also
display low volatility. Therefore, the balance of the current account is almost perfectly correlated
with the trade balance and inherits the statistical properties of the latter.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 271
Gaussian distribution accounts for the ﬂat portion of the price curve. The thin
tails of f explain why the price is almost invariant to b
 
at issuance volumes
such that the threshold z∗ takes extreme values.
The bond price plays a central role in understanding the shape of the
objective function of the government represented in Figure 4. Formally, the
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For the range of values of b  such that there is no default risk, the present
discountedwelfareincreaseswiththeissuancelevel,i.e.,theburdenofstarting
tomorrow with higher liabilities does not compensate for the extra resources
collected for current consumption.25 As the price per bond starts to fall,
there is an extra factor that appears in the tradeoff between current and future
consumption: an extra dollar of borrowing implies a lower bond price. In
particular, an extra dollar of borrowing implies a decrease in price q received
for all the bonds issued in the current period.





are such that the economy pays low spreads. This explains the low default
frequency reported in Table 3.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows that a higher endowment realization en-
ables the government to borrow more without paying a higher spread, but
the price function becomes steep at borrowing levels for which the spread
is low independently of whether the endowment shock is “low” or “high.”
This feature contributes to the explanation of why in equilibrium the govern-
ment chooses to pay low spreads at all endowment realizations, and thus the
volatility of the spread is low.
The inability of the model to generate a higher default rate and spread
volatility may be a consequence of its simplifying assumptions. Consider,
for instance, the assumption that the government can only issue one-period
bonds. Recall that as illustrated in Figure 4, the interest rate increases with
the borrowing level (the bond price decreases). The assumption of one-period
bonds implies that in every period the economy has to roll over its entire stock
of debt. Thus, the increase in the interest rate that is due to an extra dollar of
borrowing affects the entire stock of bonds and not only the last unit issued.
More precisely, consider the decision of whether to borrow x + 1 dollars or x
25 It should be stressed that this result is not general and critically depends on the parameter
values chosen, especially the value of the subjective discount factor.272 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
dollars. When the government is renewing its entire stock of debt, the higher
interestimpliedbyborrowingx+1insteadofx appliestothex+1unitsissued.
This is trivially larger than the cost induced by an increase in the interest rate
paid for the last bond issued. This argument illustrates how restricting the
government to issue one-period bonds increases the marginal issuance cost,
and thus accounts for a fraction of the low spreads generated by the model.
Even though the government is risk averse and lenders are risk neutral,
the volatility of consumption is higher than the volatility of output in both
models. As discussed in the beginning of Section 4, price q is nondecreasing
inthecurrentendowmentrealization. Thatis,ahigherendowmentenablesthe
government to issue more bonds without necessarily paying a higher spread.
Given the low value of the discount factor, the economy will seize the op-
portunity to borrow more whenever it appears, explaining why the economy
borrows more in good times. This explains why the model is able to gener-
ate a higher volatility of consumption relative to income. Formally, current
consumption is determined by current income and net borrowing, namely,
c = y −
 




σ2 (c) = σ2 (y) + 2σ[y − (qb  − b)] + σ2  
qb  − b
 
.
The positive covariance between net borrowing (b − qb ) and income
increases the volatility of consumption relative to income.
Table 3 shows that both models are able to replicate the sign of the co-
movements between trade balance, spread, and output observed in the data.
The fact that the government borrows more in good times leads to a negative
correlation between trade balance and output (as observed in the data).26 The
mechanics that determine the sign of the correlation between the spread and
output are more complex. On the one hand, if the bond price function faced
by the government is kept constant, a higher income realization today reduces
the need to borrow, and therefore it reduces the spread that the government
is willing to pay for its debt. This generates a negative correlation between
income and spread. But the bond price function also changes with the income
realization. If the price of the bond becomes less sensitive to the borrowing
levelathigherincomelevels, thegovernmentwouldbewillingtopayahigher
spread at higher income levels. The latter may change the sign of the correla-
tion between the spread and income. For example, the next section shows that
26 The trade balance is deﬁned as
tb = y − c = qb  − b.
Thus, the positive correlation between net borrowing and income translates into a negative corre-
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once the exclusion punishment is eliminated, the spread becomes pro-cyclical
in Model II.
5. RESULTS WITHOUT EXCLUSION
This section studies the implications of removing the threat of ﬁnancial ex-
clusion. Formally, this implies setting the value of φ1 equal to 1. The section
describes how the default and saving decisions change when the government
cannot be threatened with ﬁnancial exclusion. This helps to understand how
the business cycle statistics change when the exclusion assumption is aban-
doned, which is discussed later in the section entitled “Business Cycle Prop-
erties.”
Equilibrium Choices Without the Exclusion
Punishment
The common feature across Models I and II is that they are able to sustain
a lower debt level when the government does not face the threat of ﬁnancial
exclusion. In other dimensions, the model with transitory shocks without
exclusion features higher equilibrium spreads (lower equilibrium issuance
prices)andspreadsthataremoreresponsivetotheendowmentshockcompared
to the model with transitory shocks and exclusion. On the other hand, the
model with trend shocks features lower equilibrium spreads and spreads that
are less responsive to trend shocks compared to the model with exclusion.
Figure 5 illustrates how the default decisions change when exclusion can-
not be used as a punishment in Models I and II. The graphs illustrate that the
governmentdefaultsatlowerdebtlevelswhenthethreatofﬁnancialexclusion
is eliminated. The result is not surprising though. The possibility of being
excluded from capital markets imposes a cost to every default decision (re-
gardless of the size of the default). Once the threat of ﬁnancial exclusion is
eliminated, it becomes less costly to default, and thus the government ﬁnds it
optimal to default at lower debt levels.
The top panel of Figure 5 shows that in Model I the default decision
becomes relatively more sensitive to the endowment shock (and less sensitive
to the debt level) when the threat of exclusion is eliminated. This is due to
the fact that the possibility of going into ﬁnancial autarky is more painful at
lower endowment realizations than at higher endowment realizations. When
the current shock to the endowment level is higher, the need to smooth out
consumption by borrowing is weaker, and therefore the value assigned to
retaining access to capital markets is lower. In other words, the government
would suffer less from being excluded from capital markets if its endowment
levelishigher. Whenthethreatofﬁnancialexclusioniseliminated,theoverall
cost of defaulting decreases more at lower endowment realizations than at274 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Default Regions With and Without Exclusion




















































Notes: Endowment shocks at which the government is indifferent between defaulting and
not defaulting in the model with transitory shocks (top panel) and in the model with
trend shocks (bottom panel). The scale on the bottom corresponds to the models with
exclusion. The scale on the top corresponds to the models without exclusion.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 275
higher endowment realizations. This accounts for the ﬂatter default region in
the top panel of Figure 5.
The picture looks different in the model with trend shocks. The bottom
panel of Figure 5 shows that the default region becomes steeper without ex-
clusion. In this case, the mechanism described in the previous paragraph is
also present, but there is an additional effect. A higher growth rate in the cur-
rent period not only means that there are more resources available for current
consumption but also that future growth rates are likely to be high—recall
that there is persistence in growth rates. Consequently, unlike a higher tran-
sitory shock, a higher growth shock introduces an incentive to borrow more
on account of the future increases in the endowment. This means that the
value assigned to retaining access to capital markets is larger when the current
growth rate is higher. When the threat of ﬁnancial exclusion is eliminated, the
overall cost of defaulting decreases more at higher endowment realizations
than at lower endowment realizations. This explains the change in the slope
of the default regions in the model with trend shocks.
The change in the shape of the default region plays an important role
in understanding the change in the shape of the price function. The formal
link between the two is described in equation 13. For example, the steeper









 ), the steeper the price
function.
Figure 6 shows the price functions faced by the economy in Model I with
and without exclusion.27 The charts in Figure 6 show that when the threat of
exclusion is eliminated, the bond price starts to decrease at a lower issuance
level. Thismirrorstheshiftofthedefaultregionduetoalowercostofdefault.
The graphs show that the moderate change in the slope of the default regions
observed in the top panel of Figure 5 translate into a moderate change in the
slope of the price functions.
Figure 7 shows the price function faced by the economy in Model II with
and without exclusion.28 The charts show that the steeper default regions that
are observed when the threat of ﬁnancial exclusion is eliminated translate into
steeper price functions.
27 Notice that the top panel of Figure 6 represents the same functions as the top panel
of Figure 3 but with different scales. The graph is reproduced again in order to facilitate the
comparison of the shape of the price functions in the models with and without exclusion.
28 The top panel of Figure 6 represents the same functions as the bottom panel of Figure 3
but with different scales.276 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 6 Bond Price Menus in Model I With and Without Exclusion
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Notes: Bond price as a function of the issuance level in the model with transitory shocks
and exclusion (top panel) and in the model with transitory shocks and without exclusion
(bottom panel). The high (low) shock is three standard deviations higher (lower) than the
unconditional mean of z. The scale of bond issuances when the endowment shock is low
is described by the bottom horizontal axes. Likewise, the scale of bond issuances when
the endowment shock is high is described by the top horizontal axes. The different scales
used in the horizontal axes facilitate the comparison of the shape of the price functions.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 277
Figure 8 displays the equilibrium issuance price in Model I as a function
of the endowment shock realization in the speciﬁcations with and without
exclusion. The graphs show that the price at which the government issues
debt is lower and more sensitive to the endowment shock in the setup without
exclusion.
Figure 9 shows the bond prices paid in equilibrium in the model with
shocks to the trend with and without exclusion. The graphs show that the
prices at which the government issues debt are higher in the setup without
exclusion. The correlation with the endowment shock also changes. When
thegovernmentcanbethreatenedwithﬁnancialexclusionthespreaddecreases
with respect to the shock to the trend. But when the government cannot be
threatened with ﬁnancial exclusion, the spread increases with respect to the
shock to the trend.29
The Mechanics of the Equilibrium Behavior of the Spread
ThissectiondiscussesthedifferentialbehaviorofthespreadinModelsIandII
oncetheexclusionassumptionisabandoned. ConsiderﬁrsttheEulerequation
that determines the optimal borrowing level
u  (c)q0(b ,z, ,g) =
 
β
  ∂V(b ,z ,  ,g ,h)
∂b  F(dz  | z)F(dg  | g)−




The left-hand side of the equation captures the marginal beneﬁt of issuing
onemorebondtoday,i.e.,theincreaseincurrentconsumption. Theright-hand
sidecapturesthemarginalcosts. Theﬁrsttermrepresentsthe“futuremarginal
cost.” Issuing one more unit of debt today makes the economy poorer in the
future—the government will either have to pay back its debt or face the cost
of defaulting. The second term on the right-hand side represents the “present
marginal cost.” This is the cost derived from decreasing the price of all the
bonds issued today. The role of the latter was discussed more extensively in
the end of Section 4.
Inbothmodelstheoptimalissuancevolumeislowerwhenthegovernment
does not face the threat of default. An immediate consequence is that it
depresses the present marginal cost (the second term in the right-hand side of
equation (14) is the product of the borrowing level times the sensitivity of the
price to the borrowing level). The decrease in the marginal cost induced by
a lower borrowing level may be compensated, in part, by accepting a lower
price for each bond issued, which reduces the marginal beneﬁt of borrowing.
This can explain the lower equilibrium bond prices (higher spread) that are
observed in Model I when the threat of exclusion is eliminated (see Figure 8).
29 The beginning of Section 5 provides some intuition for the differential behavior of the
spread displayed by Models I and II once the exclusion assumption is abandoned.278 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 7 Bond Price Menus in Model II With and Without Exclusion
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Notes: Bond price as a function of the issuance level in the model with trend shocks
and exclusion (top panel) and in the model with trend shocks and without exclusion (bot-
tom panel). The high (low) shock is three standard deviations higher (lower) than the
unconditional mean of g. The scale of bond issuances when the trend shock is low is
described by the bottom horizontal axes. Likewise, the scale of bond issuances when the
trend shock is high is described by the top horizontal axes. The different scales used in
the horizontal axes facilitate the comparison of the shape of the price functions.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 279
Figure 8 Bond Prices Observed in Equilibrium in Model I
































Notes: Bond price observed in equilibrium in the model with transitory shocks and ex-
clusion (top panel) and in the model with transitory shocks and without exclusion (bottom
panel).280 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 9 Bond Prices Observed in Equilibrium in Model II
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Notes: Bond price observed in equilibrium in the model with trend shocks and exclusion
(top panel) and in the model with trend shocks and without exclusion (bottom panel).J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 281
Table 4 Business Cycle Statistics Computed With and Without
Exclusion Punishment
Transitory Shocks Trend Shocks
Data With Without With Without
Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion Exclusion
σ(y) 4.08 4.14 4.10 4.15 4.16
σ(c) 4.85 4.23 4.19 4.38 4.23
σ (TB/Y) 1.36 0.20 0.21 0.63 0.23
σ (Rs) 3.17 0.006 0.05 0.013 0.015
ρ (c,y) 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρ (TB/Y,y) -0.89 -0.43 -0.43 -0.29 -0.29
ρ (Rs,y) -0.59 -0.81 -0.95 -0.06 0.40
ρ (Rs,TB/Y) 0.68 0.85 0.69 0.89 -0.96
Mean Debt
Output Ratio (%) 51 6.3 1.7 4.8 1.8
Rate of Default 75 6.6 25 24 20
Notes: The debt output ratio is measured as the stock of debt divided by the annual
output level.
A similar effect is present in Model II. But in this case the bond price
becomes steeper in the setup without exclusion. This effect alone tends to
increasethepresentmarginalcostofborrowing, andthereforeunlikeModelI,
a lower bond price is not necessary to satisfy equation (14). This can explain
why the levels of the equilibrium bond prices in Model II do not change
signiﬁcantly when the threat of exclusion is eliminated (see Figure 9).
Theforcesbehindthechangesintheslopeofthespreadwithrespecttothe
endowment shock are more difﬁcult to tease out. As explained in the end of
Section4,theequilibriumrelationshipbetweenthespreadandtheendowment
shock depends on various effects, and the sign of the relationship does not
necessarily need to be negative. In fact, Figure 9 shows that in the model with
trend shocks and no exclusion, the spread increases with the growth shock.
Business Cycle Properties Under No Exclusion
The business cycle statistics reported in Table 3 are recalculated for an econ-
omy without the exclusion punishment and presented in Table 4 (the statistics
in Table 3 are reproduced in order to facilitate comparison).
The implications of removing the exclusion punishment reported inTable
4 are consistent with the discussion of equilibrium choices in the beginning
of Section 5. Table 4 shows that the assumption of exogenous exclusion is
responsible for a high fraction of the debt level supported in the model with
exclusion. Recall that in this model the government chooses borrowing levels282 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that allow the government to pay very low spreads. These levels are lower
when the default cost raised by the threat of ﬁnancial exclusion is removed.
Table4showsthatbothmodelsquantitativelyfailalongimportantdimen-
sions with or without the assumption of ﬁnancial exclusion: the default rate,
the volatility of the spread, and the volatility of the trade balance are too low
compared with the data. Even though the overall performance is poor, the
behavior of the model with transitory shocks shows a moderate improvement,
while the behavior of the model with trend shocks deteriorates when the ex-
clusion assumption is eliminated. The model with endowment shocks and
no exclusion displays a higher default rate and spread volatility compared to
the model with exclusion (but still far below the data), while the remaining
business cycle statistics are not substantially different. On the other hand, the
sign of the correlation between output and the spread, and between the spread
and the trade balance are reversed and become counterfactual in the model
with trend shocks and no exclusion.
The higher default rate generated by Model I when the threat of ﬁnancial
exclusion is eliminated is consistent with the higher equilibrium spread de-
scribed in Figure 8. The higher spread volatility observed in the setup without
exclusion is also consistent with Figure 8, which shows a higher sensitiv-
ity of the spread with respect to output in the model without exclusion. The
lowerdefaultrateandsimilarspreadvolatilitygeneratedbyModelIIwhenthe
threat of ﬁnancial exclusion is eliminated are consistent with the adjustments
illustrated in Figure 9.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Thisarticlediscussesthequantitativeperformanceofsovereigndefaultmodels
and explains how the performance is affected by the assumption that coun-
tries can be exogenously excluded from capital markets after a default. The
article compares the performance of a stylized model with and without the
threat of exclusion. It is shown that the exclusion assumption explains a high
fraction of the sovereign debt that can be sustained in equilibrium but does
not signiﬁcantly alter the remaining business cycle statistics of the model. In
effect, themodelwithoutexclusiongeneratesannualdebt-outputratiosofless
than 2 percent. The model with exclusion generates annual debt-output ratios
of 4.8 percent when the shocks hit the growth rate and of 6.3 percent when
the shocks hit the endowment level. The article shows that in the model with
shocks to the endowment level, the default decision becomes slightly more
sensitive to the endowment shock and, therefore, less sensitive to the debt
level. This helps reduce the sensitivity of the bond price to the borrowing
level. On the other hand, in the model with shocks to the trend the default
decision becomes relatively less sensitive to the endowment shock, which in-
creases the sensitivity of the bond price to the borrowing level. Given thatJ. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 283
in this class of models the excessive sensitivity of the default probability to
the borrowing level limits the models’quantitative performance, the previous
effects may help explain why the performance of the model with shocks to the
endowment level shows moderate improvement and why the performance of
the model with shocks to the trend deteriorates. In spite of this, both models
still fail along important dimensions. The default rate, the volatilities of the
trade balance and of the spread, and the debt levels are too low compared to
the data. These shortcomings suggest that the exclusion assumption does not
play an important role, and therefore future studies that do not rely on the
threat of ﬁnancial exclusion will not necessarily be handicapped in explaining
the business cycle in emerging economies. These shortcomings also suggest
that other assumptions of the model must be modiﬁed in order to bring the
model closer to the data.284 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
APPENDIX: THE MODEL WITH STOCHASTIC
DURATION OF OUTPUT LOSS
As mentioned before, the model introduced in Section 2 does not exactly
coincide with the model presented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). They
assume that following a default episode, the duration of lower output lasts as
long as the time of exclusion. Table 5 shows that the business cycle statistics
presented in Table 3 are not greatly affected by the choice of the process of
output loss—statistics computed with a stochastic duration of output loss are
taken from Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2006a) who solve the model
in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) with the computational method used in this
article.
Table 5 Business Cycles Under Different Speciﬁcations of the
Output Loss
Transitory Shocks Trend Shocks
One-Period Stochastic One-Period Stochastic
Output Loss Duration of Output Loss Duration of
Output Loss Output Loss
σ(y) 4.14 4.13 4.16 4.16
σ(c) 4.23 4.25 4.38 4.39
σ (TB/Y) 0.20 0.24 0.63 0.65
σ (Rs) 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.015
ρ (c,y) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρ (TB/Y,y) -0.43 -0.43 -0.29 -0.29
ρ (Rs,y) -0.81 -0.74 -0.06 -0.09
ρ (Rs,TB/Y) 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.91
Mean Debt
Output Ratio (%) 6.8 6.8 4.7 4.8
Rate of Default 6.6 7.8 24 22
Notes: Business cycle statistics from models with output loss in one period and models
with a stochastic duration of the output loss. The debt output ratio is measured as the
stock of debt divided by the annual output level.J. C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza: Quantitative Models 285
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